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 The Supreme Court is again tasked with deciding the constitutionality of the 
statutory regime regulating federal elections. In 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission,
1
 the Court, in a 5 to 4 vote, struck down key provisions of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, i.e., the provisions regulating independent 
expenditures by corporations and labor unions. This term, in McCutcheon v. Federal 
Election Commission,
2
 the Court will decide whether aggregate contribution limits set 
by federal statute pass constitutional muster.  
 A recent line of highly original scholarship, first promoted by Professor Zephyr 
Teachout in 2009, argued that the Constitution embodied a nontextual anti-corruption 
principle, inhering in the Constitution’s structure, which (potentially) trumped First 
Amendment concerns in the elections context.
3
 Correct or not, Teachout’s 
constitutional vision was, broadly speaking, an originalist one. By contrast, Professor 
Lawrence Lessig argues that in deciding McCutcheon, the Court should be guided by 
its prior decision in Buckley v. Valeo.
4
 In Buckley, the Court held that the 
government’s interest in preventing actual corruption or the appearance of corruption 
outweighed competing First Amendment interests, and for that reason the Buckley 
Court upheld federal statutory campaign contribution limits. To be sure, Buckley was 
not an “originalist” opinion: the Court did not assert that its “corruption” rationale was 
part of the Framers’ eighteenth century plan. Professor Lessig argues that when 
deciding the reach of Buckley’s corruption rationale, the Court should be guided by 
the Framers’ understanding of “corruption,” as opposed to the modern one announced 
in Buckley.
5
 Lessig’s position has been criticized on theoretical grounds: it is neither 
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 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Kennedy, J.).  
2
 893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012) (Brown, J., for unanimous three-judge panel), prob. juris. 
noted, 133 S. Ct. 1242, 1242 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2013) (No. 12-536). Oral argument before the Supreme 
Court of the United States was held on October 8, 2013. At the time this Essay was written, the 
Supreme Court had not yet issued an opinion.  
3
 See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009).  
4
 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).  
5
 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, More on an “originalist” understanding of “corruption,” LESSIG BLOG, 
V2 (Oct. 1, 2013), http://lessig.tumblr.com/post/62798050073/more-on-an-originalist-understanding-
of-corruption (“Reading ‘corruption’ as the Framers would have would not force the Court to reverse 
any decision it has already made. It would not, for example, undermine Citizens United. So again, the 
consistent originalist is not constrained to ignore the Framers [sic] view. Which is again why s/he 
should follow them—if consistency is the charge.” (italics added)); Lawrence Lessig, On 
“originalism” and the First Amendment (or alternatively, “please don’t throw me into the briar 
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wholly modern (per Buckley), nor wholly originalist (in any traditional sense). I will 
leave those abstract methodological concerns to others. Here, what is important to 
note is that both Lessig and Teachout agree that they have identified a stable, unified 
meaning as to how the Framers (and the public during the Framers’ era) understood 
corruption in relation to the Constitution of 1787–1788: the Constitution of the 
Framers and Ratifiers.  
 I contest their position: no such unified concept existed in 1787–1788.6 And if 
it did exist, Lessig and Teachout have failed to excavate its details from our long lost 
past; they have failed to delineate the concept’s contours; and they have failed to 
explain its precise implications for election law and, more importantly, for all (or, 
indeed, any) of the other areas of law which any such newly resurrected constitutional 
concept would necessarily impinge on.  
 
Corruption and the Constitution’s Text 
 
 Most theories of constitutional interpretation start with the text. And, of course, 
the Constitution’s text speaks directly about corruption. The Impeachment Clause7 
states that the President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States are 
subject to impeachment for “treason, bribery, or corruption.” You remember studying 
that in secondary school, right?  
Actually, you probably do not remember it, and for good reason, it is not in the 
Constitution—at least, not anymore. “Corruption” appeared in a preliminary draft of 
the Constitution’s Impeachment Clause. But this language was dropped, and 
superseded by “treason, bribery, and maladministration,” but the “maladministration” 
language appeared too vague.
8
 The Convention did not return to the earlier 
“corruption” language, and instead, it chose “treason, bribery, or other high crimes 
and misdemeanors.” We do not know precisely why the Framers dropped the original 
“corruption” language.9 Richard J. Ellis, a period historian, has suggested that 
“corruption” was dropped because “corruption”—like “maladministration”—was too 
vague.
10
 If Ellis is correct, then Lessig’s position is not tenable. If the Framers did not 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
patch”), LESSIG BLOG, V2 (Oct. 15, 2013), http://lessig.tumblr.com/post/64118233712/on-
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6
 See Seth Barrett Tillman, Opening Statement, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor 
Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 399 (2012).  
7
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.” (emphasis added)).  
8
 See WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, at 233–34 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1900).  
9
 See, e.g., Teachout, supra note 3, at 367 (“There is no explanation for why the term ‘corruption’ was 
taken out, suggesting that a committee on style or form removed it, but I have not been able to 
uncover the real reason . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
10
 See RICHARD J. ELLIS, FOUNDING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 238–39 (1999).  
 3 
think the corruption concept had sufficient clarity in 1787, then we cannot create that 
clarity today, at least, we cannot do so in the Framers’ name.  
But even if Ellis is wrong, even if “corruption” was dropped for some other 
reason, it does not matter. What matters (that is, what should matter) is that the 
Framers put “corruption” in the Constitution’s text, but they then chose to take it out, 
and even failed to put it back in when they had a clear opportunity to do so. Thus, the 
Constitution’s plain text and its drafting history pose a direct challenge to Lessig’s and 
Teachout’s position, but it is not a challenge either has ever meaningfully dealt 
with — although each has had repeated opportunities to do so.11  
 Let’s be clear. Lessig and Teachout are asking us to embrace corruption as the 
key concept espoused by the Framers of the Constitution (and of the Bill of Rights). 
But when the Framers had a chance (actually multiple chances) to give this concept 
prominence in the Constitution’s actual text, the Framers chose not to do so. It is not 
as if they forgot to use this term or, instead, used some close synonym; rather, they 
actively took this term out of the Constitution. So why should we today embrace the 
corruption concept as one having constitutional scope or dimension? And, more 
importantly, how can Lessig or Teachout ask us to do so as an exercise in originalism 
or in the name of the long-dead Framers?  
 
James Madison’s Federalist No. 52: “Dependent on the People Alone” 
 
 In his McCutcheon brief, Professor Lessig argues that the Framers had “a very 
specific conception of the term ‘corruption’.”12 In other words, the Framers sought to 
craft government institutions in which officials, in particular members of the House 
and the President, avoided “improper dependencies” and, instead, were “dependent on 
the people alone.”13  
Turing to the Incompatibility Clause as an example, Professor Lessig explains: 
“the Framers blocked an improper dependence of the legislature upon the Executive, 
by banning legislators from serving [concurrently] as executive officers.”14 I agree 
that the purpose of the Incompatibility Clause was to prevent members of Congress 
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 See, e.g., Teachout, supra note 9. I am not suggesting that Professors Lessig and Teachout are in 
agreement on every aspect of their corruption-related research. See generally infra notes 13 & 29. 
12
 Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Lawrence Lessig in Support of Appellee (“Lessig Brief”) at 2, 
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, No. 12-536 (U.S. July 25, 2013), 2013 WL 3874388, 
at *2 (“The Framers had a very specific conception of the term ‘corruption’ in mind, one at odds with 
McCutcheon’s more modern understanding of that term.”) (filed by the Constitutional Accountability 
Center).  
13
 Id. at 3 & 8 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 2003)); Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand ‘Corruption’ to Mean, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. 1 passim (2014). But cf. id. at 5 n.12 (distinguishing Professor Zephyr Teachout’s 
position from Tillman’s position); Yasmin Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming circa June 2014) (manuscript at 10–13) (distinguishing Teachout’s position 
from Lessig’s), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2401297.  
14
 Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61, 70 (2012); cf. Lessig 
Brief, supra note 12, at 11 (citing the Ineligibility Clause).  
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from being dependent on the President (at least in regard to holding concurrent federal 
office). But that limited purpose hardly establishes that the Incompatibility Clause was 
an exemplar of a higher level purpose to ensure that members were dependent “on the 
people alone.” If the latter really had been the Framers’ goal, then the Framers would 
have actively blocked many other dependencies, and this they did not do.  
For example, nothing in the Constitution prevents members from concurrently 
holding state offices, even those within the appointment power of state governors 
(acting with or without a council). Indeed, in the First Congress, several members also 
held state legislative seats, and other members held state judicial and executive 
offices.
15
 These latter members of Congress were not dependent “on the people 
alone”—they were dependent on state government appointments, salaries, and 
sinecures.  
Likewise, in terms of setting Congress’ initial salary in 1789 or any subsequent 
raise, each House was dependent on the other House, and both Houses were 
dependent (absent a veto-proof majority in both Houses) on the President.
16
 It is very 
difficult to square this salary-related dependence with the scrupulous care the Framers 
took to ensure member independence in regard to concurrent federal office-holding. 
Why the different treatment? If the Incompatibility Clause is rooted in maintaining 
members’ independence vis-à-vis the President, then why was the independence 
concern set aside when members’ very salaries were in play? Maybe this question has 
an answer, but it is not one Professor Lessig has shared with us. And without a good 
answer, we cannot simply assume that the Framers’ global purpose was to preserve 
members’ dependence “on the people alone.”  
Finally, nothing in the Constitution prevents members of Congress (or, even, 
the President) from concurrently holding interests in private (domestic or foreign) 
commercial entities. Members of Congress are not constitutionally precluded from 
holding interests in private entities with litigation before the federal courts. Likewise, 
members are not precluded from personally acting as private attorneys for such 
entities in litigation before the federal courts. Indeed, members are not constitutionally 
precluded from holding interests in commercial entities doing business or seeking 
contracts with the federal government. In all these situations, the members are 
dependent on someone or some entity other than “the people alone.” In short, our 
Constitution, the Constitution of 1787, banned certain dependencies, but it left others 
(presumptively) permitted or, at least, strangely unresolved.  
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 See Seth Barrett Tillman, supra note 6, at 405–08 (collecting authority); see also Seth Barrett 
Tillman, Closing Statement, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A 
Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180, 195–200 (2013) (same).  
16
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation 
for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.”); U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (Presentment and Veto Clause). But cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (“No law, 
varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until 
an election of Representatives shall have intervened.”). The Twenty-Seventh Amendment was 
proposed by Congress in 1789, but it was not ratified by three-quarters of the states until 1992. See 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-
seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677 (1993).  
 5 
In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how Professor Lessig can tease out, 
from the very uneven constitutional text, his “very specific” Framing-era conception 
of corruption—demanding elected-official dependence “on the people alone.”  
 
The Foreign Emoluments Clause 
 
[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under the[] [United 
States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, 
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, 
or foreign State.  
—U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 
 
 In regard to the Foreign Emoluments Clause, Professor Lessig writes: “And 
most relevant to the conception of ‘dependence corruption’ that I have advanced here: 
the Framers banned members [of Congress] from receiving ‘any present, Emolument, 
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State’ 
without the consent of Congress.”17 For the reasons I explain below, Professor 
Lessig’s direct and systematic reliance on the Foreign Emoluments Clause is 
problematic.
18
  
 First, state offices are again a significant problem: the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause does not apply to state positions. Indeed, this clause had a predecessor in the 
Articles of Confederation, but the earlier confederation incarnation of this clause 
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 Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, supra note 14, at 70 (quoting the Foreign Emoluments Clause) 
(emphasis added).  
18
 See id.; Lessig Brief, supra note 12, at 12–14 (same); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, 
LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 18 (2011) (expounding on the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, and its historical genesis during the confederation period, with particular 
reference to members of Congress); id. (“The core corruption the Framers wanted to avoid was 
Parliament’s loss of independence . . . .” (emphasis added)). For example, Professor Lessig writes that 
the “the Framers didn’t want a Congress that was a farm league for the French Riviera.” Lessig, A 
Reply to Professor Hasen, supra note 14, at 70. I very much doubt that the Framers’ congressional 
corruption concerns (such as those they actually held) were rooted in images of the “French Riviera” 
or sports teams’ “farm leagues.” My comment is not meant to be snarky, but to remind one that it is 
all too easy to project our modern vision on the now silent Framers and call our vision their own. The 
danger of such presentism is not just that we might misunderstood the past, but that we might also fail 
to fairly value how understanding the actual past might benefit our shared present. Compare, e.g., THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 342 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“From what quarter can 
the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal 
rulers and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that we are at this 
time a free and independent nation? . . . Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was 
not betrayed [by the Articles Congress]; nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular 
ever suffered, even from the whispers of calumny.”), with LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra at 18 
(“Imagine a young democracy, its legislators passionate and eager to serve their new republic. A 
neighboring king begins to send the legislators gifts. . . . Soon the legislators have a life that depends, 
in part at least, upon those gifts. . . . Just such a dynamic was the fear that led our Framers to add to 
our Constitution . . . . Article I, section 9, clause 8 . . . .”).  
 6 
expressly applied to both state and federal positions.
19
 So the Constitution of 1787, 
our constitution, liberalized the foreign government gift-giving regime. Keep in mind 
that under the Constitution of 1787, state legislatures: (i) had the power to call 
Article V conventions and to ratify proposed constitutional amendments;
20
 (ii) had the 
power to choose United States senators;
21
 and (iii) also had the power to directly select 
presidential electors,
22
 a power they sometimes exercised. Similarly, state governors, 
then and now, had and have the power to fill vacancies in the Senate, at least in certain 
circumstances.
23
 (And, although the question is not entirely free from doubt, there is 
good reason to believe that neither the Foreign Emoluments Clause nor its “office” 
language reach federal electors.
24
) Why did the Framers permit foreign governments 
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 Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, cl. 1 (“[N]or shall any person holding any 
office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept any present, emolument, office 
or title of any kind whatever from any King, Prince or foreign State . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under the[] [United 
States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or 
Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” (emphasis added)), and Seth 
Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, supra note 15, 
at 195–98 (discussing inapplicability of the Foreign Emoluments Clause to state offices), 201–03 
(same). Note that the Constitution permits a federal officer to accept a foreign government’s gift if the 
officer has congressional consent. But, no such language appeared in the coordinate provision in the 
Articles of Confederation. In short, here too, the Constitution of 1787 liberalized the foreign 
government gift-giving regime. See id. at 204–06 (discussing congressional consent).  
20
 See U.S. CONST. art. V.  
21
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof . . . .”), amended by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XVII, cl. 1 (mandating direct election of senators).  
22
 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives 
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII 
(mandating separate elector votes for President and Vice President); cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 
113–15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
23
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (“[I]f Vacancies [in the U.S. Senate] happen by Resignation, or 
otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make 
temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such 
Vacancies.”), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 2 (“When vacancies happen in the 
representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of 
election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive 
thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the 
legislature may direct.”). It appears that, on occasion, governors have used this power to appoint 
themselves to vacant Senate seats. See Ken Rudin, When Governors Appoint Themselves To The 
Senate, NPR: POLITICAL JUNKIE (Sept. 8, 2009, 3:54 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/politicaljunkie/2009/09/when_governors_appoint_themsel.html.  
24
 In United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385 (1867) (Swayne, J.), the Supreme Court explained: “The 
term [“office”] embraces the ideas of [1] tenure, [2] duration, [3] emolument, and [4] duties.” Id. 
at 393 (emphasis added). First, the position of elector is temporary: it lacks meaningful duration—the 
position ceases once the electors vote for President and Vice President. Second, no federal statute 
grants the position of elector any emoluments. Third, an elector has only a single discretionary duty—
to vote for President and Vice President, as opposed to multiple duties (as required by Hartwell). 
Finally, whether an elector has tenure remains unclear, but some judicial authority suggests the 
 7 
to give gifts to state officials
25
 (and to federal electors), if, as Professor Lessig argues, 
they were trying to create a constitutional order in which improper foreign 
dependencies were minimized?  
Second, Professor Lessig assumes that the Foreign Emoluments Clause (that is, 
its “office . . . under the United States” language) applies to members of Congress. He 
offers no support, argument, or evidence for his position. However, the text of the 
Constitution strongly suggests otherwise. For example, the Elector Incompatibility 
Clause states: “[N]o Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust 
or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”26 Now it is possible 
that the language of the Elector Incompatibility Clause is redundant, and that the 
“Office . . . under the United States” language also includes senators and 
representatives. But the alternative reading is simpler: senator, representative, and 
“Office . . . under the United States” are three distinct categories. Indeed, the strong 
consensus today among legal academics is that the Constitution embraces a hard 
distinction between, on the one hand, rank-and-file members of Congress, and, on the 
other hand, officers affiliated with the Executive and Judicial Branches.
27
 In other 
words, members are not officers as those terms are used in the Constitution of 1787. 
Professor Lessig needs to give us a reason to believe that members of Congress are 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
position lacks tenure. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (Fuller, C.J.) (“Whatever 
provisions may be made by statute, or by the state constitution, to choose electors by the people, there 
is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken 
away nor abdicated.” (emphasis added)).  
Alternatively, if electors are not properly characterized as “officers under the United States,” but are, 
instead, better characterized either as state officers or holders of Article VI “public trusts under the 
United States,” than the Foreign Emoluments Clause simply does not apply to the position of elector. 
See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan, The Very Faithless Elector?, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 123 passim (2001) 
(hypothesizing that federal electors are not officers “of” or “under” the United States, and are, instead, 
holders of “public trusts under the United States” per Article VI); Beverly J. Ross & William 
Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 J. LAW & POLITICS 665, 692 (2002) 
(“Relevant constitutional provisions imply that electors are state, not federal, officers.”).  
25
 Just as the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not apply to members of state legislatures and to state 
governors, the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not apply either to other state executive branch 
officials (including those charged with executing federal law or protecting federal interests) or to state 
judges (who could rule on issues, claims, and defenses arising under federal law). See 4 JOHN 
BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 651, at 577 (1906) (“The provisions of the 
Constitution ‘neither prevent nor authorize persons who may hold office under any one of the States 
from accepting an appointment under a foreign government.’” (quoting State Department 
correspondence from 1872)); cf., e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 227–28 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (explaining that the Constitution would “enable the [federal] government 
to employ the ordinary magistracy of each [state], in the execution of its laws”).  
26
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (Elector Incompatibility Clause). Likewise, the text of the 
Incompatibility Clause also suggests that membership in Congress and holding office under the 
United States are distinct categories. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any 
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.” 
(emphasis added)).  
27
 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law 
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995).  
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subsumed under the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s “office” language. But he never 
does.  
Indeed, Professor Lessig must do more than proffer “a reason” to believe that 
the Constitution’s and, more specifically, the Foreign Emolument Clause’s “office” 
language reach members of Congress. Rather, he must show that his reading of the 
Constitution is the best originalist reading
28—one consistent with his extraordinary 
claim that “[t]he Framers had a very specific conception of the term ‘corruption’.”29 
My own view is that merely acknowledging Framing-era diversity on this long-
standing interpretive question (i.e., the scope of the Constitution’s “office” language) 
would seriously undermine Professor Lessig’s position. And is it really surprising that 
the Framers and their contemporaries expressed complex, nuanced, and diverse views 
on this subject?
30
  
                                                             
28
 Cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025, 3072 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“When interpreting constitutional text, the goal is to discern the most 
likely public understanding of a particular provision at the time it was adopted.” (emphasis added)); 
Amar & Amar, supra note 27, at 136 n.143 (“The Constitution must mean something—the best 
reading of the document either permits or bars legislative succession.”).  
29
 Lessig Brief, supra note 12, at 2 (emphasis added). I think it interesting to note that Professor 
Lessig’s historical claim in this regard is somewhat different from the position put forward by 
Professor Zephyr Teachout. Lessig has argued that the Framers had “a very specific conception of the 
term ‘corruption’.” Id. By contrast, Teachout has argued that the Framers embraced a family of 
corruption-related conceptions. Compare, e.g., Teachout, supra note 3, at 373–74 (“To the 
[Philadelphia] delegates, political corruption referred to self-serving use of public power for private 
ends, including, without limitation, bribery, public decisions to serve private wealth made because of 
dependent relationships, public decisions to serve executive power made because of dependent 
relationships, and use by public officials of their positions of power to become wealthy.” (emphasis 
added)), with Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, supra note 14, at 70 (“The classical conception of 
corruption that animated the Framers was not an obsession with the Rod Blagojevichs of the age.” 
(emphasis added) (citing Teachout)), and Lawrence Lessig, On What Being A (Small r) Republican 
Means, 74 MONT. L. REV. 37, 40 (2013) (“I do not mean Rod Blagojevich corruption—buying and 
selling public office for personal gain. . . . I mean corruption relative to a baseline—the Framers’ 
baseline—for how this nation was to function.” (emphasis added)).  
30
 Compare, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 485–86 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, 2d ed. 1836) (illustrating that 
Edmund Randolph took the position that the Constitution’s “office” language reached members of 
Congress), with JAMES MONROE, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT (Petersburg, Hunter & Prentis 1788), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MONROE 347, 361 (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1898) 
(illustrating that James Monroe took the position that the Constitution’s “office” language did not 
reach members of Congress, and expressly objecting to Randolph’s contrary position); compare 
DEBATES, supra at 202 (illustrating that Randolph thought Senators could be impeached), with 
MONROE, supra, at 383 (“The persons subject to impeachment, are the President, Vice-President, and 
all civil officers of the United States, and no others.” (emphasis added)), and id. at 398–99 (same); 
compare, e.g., 3 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 72–73 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1826) (recording July 7, 1797 House resolution 
impeaching Senator Blount), with 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2319 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1851) 
(recording January 11, 1799 Senate adoption of a resolution to the effect that: “this Court ought not to 
hold jurisdiction” over the Blount impeachment). Indeed, even where the Framers have left us 
records, modern authorities divide in regard to what was meant. Compare, e.g., MICHAEL J. 
 9 
My own view (albeit, which is not widely shared) is that the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause’s “office . . . under the United States” language extends to all 
positions subject to supervision in the regular course of their duties, including 
positions created, regularized, or defeasible by federal statute, i.e., subconstitutional, 
non-elected, or statutory positions in any of the three branches of the federal 
government, and that this language does not extend to elected or constitutionally 
mandated positions in any branch. There is an abundance of early American materials 
supporting this view.
31
  
For example, in 1792, the Senate ordered Secretary of the Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton to draft a financial statement listing all persons holding “office . . . under the 
United States” and their salaries. Hamilton’s response, which was roughly ninety 
manuscript-sized pages, included personnel in each of the three branches of the 
federal government, including the Legislative Branch, but Hamilton did not include 
the President, Vice President, Senators, or Representatives. In other words, Hamilton 
did not include any elected positions in any branch.
32
 Similarly, in 1791, President 
George Washington received, accepted, and kept a gift from the French ambassador to 
the United States, but Washington never sought nor received congressional consent to 
keep this valuable gift.
33
 Washington received, accepted, and kept at least one other 
such gift during his presidency.
34
 And, here too, he did not ask for or receive 
congressional consent. These gifts were not a secret; but, I have to yet discover even 
one anti-administration representative or senator or anyone in the press (or even 
anyone in private correspondence) who stated that Washington acted corruptly or 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS 15 & 199 n.21 (2d ed. 2000) (citing Federalist No. 66 for the proposition that Hamilton 
believed that “members of Congress could not be impeached”), with BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE 
FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS AND THE CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM 
BLOUNT 49 & n.105 (1998) (citing Federalist No. 66 for the proposition that Hamilton believed that 
legislators were amenable to impeachment); compare, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 153 n.9 (8th ed. 2010) (“[W]hen the Senate impeaches someone, it can 
impose a disqualification for U.S. Representative and Senator, as well as any other office of trust 
under the United States.” (emphasis added)), with Amar & Amar, supra note 27, at 115 (asserting that 
“‘Officers’ of or under the United States thus means certain members of the executive and judicial 
branches, but not legislators . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
31
 See also, e.g., DAVID A. MCKNIGHT, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 346 
(Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1878) (“It is obvious that . . . the President is not regarded as ‘an 
officer of, or under, the United States,’ but as one branch of ‘the Government.’” (emphasis added)); 
cf. State ex rel. Ragsdale v. Walker, 33 S.W. 813, 814 (Mo. 1896) (Macfarlane, J.) (“An office under 
the state must be one created by the laws of the state. The incumbent must be governed by state laws 
and must exercise his powers and perform his duties in obedience to a statute of the state.” (emphasis 
added)). Foreign materials also agree. See, e.g., ANNE TWOMEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW SOUTH 
WALES 438 (2004) (“As it is an elective office, and not generally subject to the direction or 
supervision of the government, one would assume that it is not an office held ‘under the Crown’.” 
(emphasis added)).  
32
 See Seth Barrett Tillman, supra note 6, at 410–15.  
33
 See id. at 415–17.  
34
 See id. at 415 n.46.  
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wrongfully. Modern originalists—including Professor Lessig35—usually consider the 
precedents established by President Washington and his administration (including 
Secretary Hamilton) as strong indicia of the Constitution’s original public meaning.  
 Professor Lessig called the Foreign Emoluments Clause the “most relevant” of 
all constitutional provisions in regard to his dependence corruption theory. But unless 
George Washington was corrupt and the whole country silently complicit in his 
corruption, it seems to follow that the Foreign Emoluments Clause did not (originally) 
apply to any elected officials, state or federal. And if that is correct, then there is really 
nothing much left of Professor Lessig’s dependence corruption position to salvage.  
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reviewed), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2342945, also available at 
http://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/428/, and NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTION CENTER CONSTITUTION DAILY (Oct. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2013/10/why-lessigs-dependence-corruption-is-
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35
 In his own writings, Professor Lessig has turned to Washington, Hamilton, and precedents set 
during the Washington administration. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President 
and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 75 (1994) (“Moreover, nowhere in the debate in 
Congress is there a suggestion of this constitutional concern [in regard to the Invalid Pensions Act 
of 1792]. Nor did President Washington indicate that there was anything problematic about the statute 
as written.”); id. at 13 n.42 (explaining “President Washington’s self-conception of his role in the 
legislative process”); id. at 49 (“[N]ot even Hamilton described the Vesting Clause as an independent 
source of substantive executive power, though he was in general quite eager to define a strong 
executive.”); see also, e.g., id. at 26–27 (“Whatever dispute there may be about the removal power of 
the President over the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and similar officers, there is no ambiguity about a 
central point: the first Congress conceived of the proper organizational structure for different 
executive departments differently. This conception, we believe, argues against the belief in a strongly 
unitary executive.” (footnotes omitted) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton))).  
